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A MORE PERFECT SYSTEM:
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I. AN UNSUSTAINABLE SYSTEM
In February 2002, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA),
which adjudicates appeals from the immigration courts of the United
1
States, was broken and badly in need of repair. The most obvious
problem was a backlog of more than fifty-seven thousand pending
cases—a number that had been steadily growing for more than a
decade. Of those pending cases, more than thirty-eight thousand were
over a year old. And more than thirteen thousand cases were over
Copyright © 2009 by John D. Ashcroft and Kris W. Kobach.
† John D. Ashcroft served as Attorney General of the United States from 2001 to 2005,
and is currently Distinguished Professor of Law and Government at Regent University. A.B.
1964, Yale University; J.D. 1967, University of Chicago Law School. Mr. Ashcroft is also
Chairman of the Ashcroft Consulting Group, LLC.
†† Kris W. Kobach is Professor of Law at the University of Missouri (Kansas City) School
of Law. A.B. 1988, Harvard University; M.Phil. 1990, Oxford University; D.Phil. 1992, Oxford
University; J.D. 1995, Yale Law School. From 2001 to 2003, Mr. Kobach was White House
Fellow and Counsel to Attorney General Ashcroft, serving as the Attorney General’s chief
adviser on immigration law and border security.
The authors would like to thank Benjamin McMillen and Xanthia Jeaunville of the
University of Missouri (Kansas City) School of Law for their diligent research and assistance in
the production of this Article.
1. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) is part of the Executive Office for
Immigration Review, which is a component of the Department of Justice. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.0(a)
(2008). Members of the BIA are executive branch officials whose decisions ultimately speak for
the Department of Justice. The BIA has nationwide jurisdiction to review both immigration
judges’ decisions and some decisions made by district directors of the Department of Homeland
Security. The BIA is “the highest administrative body for interpreting and applying immigration
laws,” U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review, Board of Immigration
Appeals, http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/biainfo.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2009), subject to review by
the attorney general, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS, BOARD OF
IMMIGRATION APPEALS PRACTICE MANUAL 11 (2008), http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/vll/
qapracmanual/pracmanual/chap1.pdf. The attorney general has the authority to assign BIA
cases to himself and to overrule BIA decisions that deviate from the executive branch’s
interpretation of immigration law. Id.
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three years old. Even worse, a significant number of cases were over
2
five years old.
Such a massive case backlog severely impaired the rule of law in
immigration and defeated the objective of timely and efficient
adjudication of appeals. The backlog also gave opportunistic
immigration lawyers an incentive to file frivolous appeals in which the
aliens had no valid argument. Even though they knew their clients
could not win, such lawyers could exploit the bottleneck in the system
to guarantee their clients additional years within the United States.
A second problem, which was the chief cause of the first, was the
method of adjudicating appeals. Until 1999, three-member panels
reviewed all cases, even cases that presented no colorable basis for
3
appeal. This resulted in a colossal diversion of public resources to
cases that did not merit the attention and coordination of three BIA
members. In 1999, the Clinton Justice Department implemented a
limited streamlining initiative to address the problem. That initiative
allowed certain categories of appeals to be adjudicated by a single
member rather than a three-member panel. The 1999 initiative was
reviewed favorably by an external auditor in 2001. It had resulted in
an approximately 50 percent increase in overall BIA productivity in
4
fiscal year 2001. The BIA reforms of 2002, described below, would
build upon that success and focus the time and resources of threemember panels on cases that warranted this expenditure of public
resources.
A third problem was the standard of review that the BIA
routinely applied in reconsidering factual determinations made by
immigration judges. Unlike Article III courts of appeals, the BIA was
revisiting de novo the factual determinations made in the immigration
5
courts below. Instead of deferring to the factual findings of an
immigration judge who had the benefit of live testimony to assess the
credibility of witnesses, the BIA would make factual findings anew
without appropriate deference to the court below. It is a well-settled

2. In February 2002, the number of pending cases before the Board of Immigration
Appeals was 57,949. Of these, 38,843 were more than a year old, and 13,707 were more than
three years old. This information comes from Department of Justice statistics that are in the
possession of the authors.
3. Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Management, 67
Fed. Reg. 54,878, 54,879 (Aug. 26, 2002) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 3).
4. See id. (referencing the external audit). The Board decided 31,789 cases in FY 2001, id.
at 54,878. Of those, 15,372 cases were decided under the streamlined procedures. Id. at 54,875.
5. See id. at 54,888 (eliminating de novo review of fact finding).
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principle that courts of appeals do not lightly reopen the factual
findings of the trial courts below. Reading a cold transcript long after
the trial, appellate courts are too far removed from the evidence to
evaluate it accurately. Therefore, appellate courts normally disrupt
the factual findings of trial courts only when the findings rise to the
level of being “clearly erroneous.”
De novo review of factual findings is especially inappropriate in
the immigration court context. Most immigration cases involve a
sparse paper record and very few corroborating witnesses or none at
all. Often the only live testimony is provided by the alien himself. In
asylum cases, for example, there are rarely, if ever, corroborating
witnesses testifying about specific threats to the alien in the alien’s
country of origin. General country condition reports from the State
Department may be presented, but they leave many specific questions
unanswered. The most salient evidence of a “well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion,” which is the central
6
requirement for the granting of asylum, is usually the testimony of
the alien himself. Thus, if the system is to render a correct judgment,
an accurate evaluation of the alien’s credibility is essential. Only the
immigration judge has the opportunity to look the alien in the eye to
assess his or her credibility. An immigration judge will often question
an alien directly if gaps or inconsistencies in the individual’s story
emerge. By engaging in de novo review of factual findings on appeal,
the BIA was giving aliens two bites at the apple—two opportunities
to present their facts. And the higher court was in a worse position to
make an accurate factual judgment. This odd appellate procedure
called into question the correctness of many of the factual findings
that the BIA offered.
In short, the BIA had reached a crisis point by 2002. The backlog
was out of control. Justice was being delayed, creating a perverse
incentive to appeal meritless cases. Public resources were being
squandered in these cases through the inefficient use of threemember panels. And the BIA was calling into question its own
decisionmaking by engaging in ad hoc factual inquiries under the
inappropriate de novo standard. Reform was required.

6. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006).
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II. THE 2002 BIA REFORMS
On February 6, 2002, the Department of Justice announced a
7
package of sweeping reforms of the BIA. The department’s
objectives were to eliminate the case backlog gradually, apply the
appellate practices and standards of Article III courts to the BIA,
focus the resources of three-member panels on those cases that
needed them the most, prevent unwarranted delays, and enhance the
8
quality of BIA decisionmaking. All of this would be done while
ensuring that due process would be provided in every case. The
proposed rule implementing these reforms was promulgated on
9
February 19, 2002, and the final rule was promulgated on August 26,
10
2002. The elements of the 2002 reforms were as follows.
(1) Instead of automatically going to a three-member panel of
the BIA, all cases would go first to a screening panel, where a single
member would either decide the case or determine that it was
11
appropriate for three-member panel review. Instead of squandering
the time and attention of three-member panels on cases that were
relatively simple, the BIA would be able to focus those resources on
12
cases in which searching appellate review was most needed. Threemember panels would be used in six situations:
(a) to settle inconsistencies between the rulings of different
immigration judges,
(b) to resolve ambiguities in the immigration laws,
(c) to decide appeals involving matters of national importance,
(d) to correct decisions that are plainly not in conformity with
the law,
(e) to correct factual determinations that appear to be clearly
erroneous, and

7. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice Unveils Administrative
Rule Change to Board of Immigration Appeals in Order to Eliminate Massive Backlog of More
than 56,000 Cases (Feb. 6, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2002/February/
02_ag_063.htm.
8. See Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case
Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 7309, 7309–10 (proposed Feb. 19, 2002) (describing the objectives of
the rule changes).
9. Id. at 7309–18.
10. Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Management, 67
Fed. Reg. at 54,878–905.
11. Id. at 54,880.
12. Id.
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(f) to reverse the decision of an immigration judge or the
Immigration and Naturalization Service, other than a
13
reversal under sec. 3.1(e)(5).
All aliens would retain their right to appeal any board decision to
14
the appropriate U.S. court of appeals.
(2) The reforms eliminated the BIA’s de novo review of factual
issues. The BIA would accept the factual findings of the immigration
15
judges, disturbing them only if they were “clearly erroneous” —

ASHCROFT IN FINAL.DOC

1996

6/24/2009 8:49:56 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 58:1991

23

suspending the time limits described above. The BIA was also
directed to assign priority to cases involving detained persons,
ensuring that those individuals have their cases resolved without
24
delay. In addition, the chairman of the BIA was directed to establish
a case management system for the expeditious resolution of all
25
appeals. Cases would no longer sit idle before the BIA for several
years.
(4) The reforms restored a regulatory provision that allowed the
BIA to summarily dismiss an appeal that is filed for an improper
26
purpose, such as to cause unnecessary delay.
(5) Jurisdiction over appeals of Immigration and Naturalization
Service (now Immigration and Customs Enforcement) decisions
imposing administrative fines were transferred from the BIA to the
27
Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer (OCAHO).
In addition to these procedural reforms, the Department of
28
Justice modified the size of the BIA to eleven members. Beginning
in 1995, the department had incrementally increased the number of
29
BIA members from five to twenty-three. This expansion of the
board, however, did not speed up the completion of decisions.
30
Rather, the backlog of cases only grew larger. It was plain that the
backlog was not a personnel problem; it was fundamentally a problem
of procedure. In 2006, the department modified the size of the BIA
31
once again, changing it to a fifteen-member body. This Article will
not focus on the fluctuating size of the BIA, which does not trigger

23. Id. at 54,902.
24. See id. at 54,896 (“The Department also believes that 8 CFR 3.1(e)(8) sufficiently
directs the Board to assign priority to deciding case appeals involving detained respondents.”).
25. Id. at 54,903.
26. Id. at 54,902.
27. See id. at 54,900 (stating that this issue will be addressed in a separate final ruling).
28. Id. at 54,901. At the time the 2002 BIA reforms were announced, the number of BIA
positions was twenty-three, with nineteen positions filled and four vacancies. Id. at 54,878. On
April 18, 2003, the board was reduced to eleven members after a 180-day transition period as
directed by the regulations. See id. at 54,901 (stating that the reduction should occur within six
months of the implementation of the screening system). Normal attrition had reduced the board
to sixteen members, and the remaining five were reassigned to vacancies in Executive Office of
Immigration Review.
29. Id. at 54,878.
30. See Kris W. Kobach, Courting Chaos: Senate Proposal Undermines Immigration Law,
HERITAGE RESEARCH (Heritage Found., WebMemo No. 1083, 2006), http://www.heritage.org/
Research/Immigration/wm1083.cfm.
31. See Memorandum from U.S. Att’y Gen. to the Deputy Att’y Gen. et al. (Aug. 9, 2006),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/readingroom/ag-080906.pdf.

ASHCROFT IN FINAL.DOC

2009]

6/24/2009 8:49:56 AM

IMMIGRATION REFORM

1997

any colorable due process claims and was not central to the 2002 BIA
reforms. Rather, this Article will consider the various procedural
issues presented by the reforms, and subsequent judicial review of
those reforms.
The 2002 BIA reforms are often associated with an increase in
BIA cases that are “affirmed without opinion” (AWO). In such a
decision, which is rendered by a single member, the following
boilerplate language must be used: “The Board affirms, without
opinion, the result of the decision below. The decision is, therefore,
32
the final agency determination.” The decision to affirm without
opinion “approves the result reached in the decision below,” but
“does not necessarily imply approval of all of the reasoning of that
33
decision.” An affirmance without opinion, however, does “signify
the Board’s conclusion that any errors in the [immigration judge’s]
34
decision . . . were harmless or immaterial.”
Although the use of the AWO did increase because the
percentage of BIA cases decided by single members increased after
2002, the 2002 BIA reforms neither mandated this result nor created
the AWO. Indeed, the AWO was introduced in the 1999 streamlining
reforms, which gave the chairman of the BIA authority to designate
categories of cases that would be decided by single members, but
mandated that all single-member decisions be affirmances without
35
opinion. In fiscal year 2001, over 58 percent of BIA cases were
36
decided by single members who affirmed without opinion. The 2002
BIA reforms actually removed the 1999 requirement that a singlemember decision be an AWO and provided that, “[i]f the Board
member to whom an appeal is assigned determines, upon
consideration of the merits, that the decision is not appropriate for
affirmance without opinion, the Board member shall issue a brief
order affirming, modifying, or remanding the decision under
37
review.” The 2002 BIA reforms also gave single members deciding
cases the option to “reverse the decision under review if such reversal
is plainly consistent with and required by intervening Board or
32. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4)(ii) (2008).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Executive Office for Immigration Review; Board of Immigration Appeals:
Streamlining, 64 Fed. Reg. 56,135, 56,141 (Oct. 18, 1999) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 3).
36. Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Management, 67
Fed. Reg. 54,878, 54,879 (Aug. 26, 2002) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 3).
37. Id. at 54,903 (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(5)).
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judicial precedent, by an intervening Act of Congress, or by an
38
intervening final regulation.”
Thus, for the first time, the 2002 reforms provided single
members deciding cases with multiple options in addition to the
AWO. It is therefore incorrect to assert, as one observer has, that the
2002 BIA reforms “encourag[ed] routine ‘affirmances without
39
opinion.’” On the contrary, the issuance of an AWO became less
routine and more discretionary. It is also true, however, that an
increase in AWO opinions was a foreseeable result of the 2002 BIA
reforms. The total number of AWO opinions per year increased as
the 2002 BIA reforms allocated a larger share of the board’s cases to
40
single-member decisions. Accordingly, this Article will consider the
use of the AWO and its impact within the larger context of the 1999
and 2002 BIA reforms.
The 2002 BIA reforms had an immediate and significant impact
on the efficiency of the BIA. After the reforms were implemented,
the board was able to complete a far higher number of cases per
month, more than keeping up with its workload. The following figures
illustrate the improvement. In fiscal year 2001, the board completed
41
an average of 2,649 cases per month. After the reforms, in fiscal year
42
2003, the board had increased its average to 4,314 cases per month.
This improved efficiency enabled the BIA to reduce the backlog
of older cases progressively. When the Department of Justice
announced the reforms in February 2002, the number of pending
cases was 57,949. Of these, 38,843 were more than a year old. And
43
13,707 were more than three years old. By May 2003, the number of
pending cases was down to just over thirty-eight thousand. Of these,
10,117 were more than a year old. And only 1,521 were more than

38. Id.
39. DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 1 (2003),
available at http://www.dorsey.com/files/upload/Summary-Conclusion_DorseyABAStudy.pdf
(summarizing the results of the full report, infra note 40).
40. DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, STUDY CONDUCTED FOR THE AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION POLICY, PRACTICE AND PRO BONO RE: BOARD
OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS: PROCEDURAL REFORMS TO ENHANCE CASE MANAGEMENT 40
(2003), available at http://www.dorsey.com/files/upload/DorseyStudyABA_8mgPDF.pdf.
41. See Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case
Management, 67 Fed. Reg. at 54,878 (presenting data that in fiscal year 2001, the Board decided
31,789 cases).
42. This information is from Department of Justice statistics in the possession of the
authors.
43. See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text.
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three years old. Thus, the backlog of cases more than a year old had
44
been reduced by more than twenty-eight thousand in fifteen months.
By 2006, the BIA would eliminate the backlog entirely, resolving the
vast majority of cases within one year. In January 2006, the number of
45
pending cases was down to approximately twenty-eight thousand.
This is the normal level that one would expect in a system that
receives more than forty thousand new appeals per year and resolving
46
all but the most extraordinary cases in less than twelve months.
III. THE BIA STREAMLINING REFORMS: UNDEFEATED
IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS
The 2002 reforms, in combination with the earlier reforms of
1999, prompted a volley of due process challenges in eleven U.S.
circuit courts of appeals, all of which were decided in 2003 and 2004.
The challenges were aided by amicus briefs submitted by
organizations such as the American Immigration Law Foundation
47
and the American Immigration Lawyers Association. Their
concerted arguments, however, were met with no success. Every
single one of these due process challenges was rejected. As a result, a
stable and overwhelming consensus among the circuits emerged in an
unusually short period of time.
At the outset, it must be noted that the U.S. Supreme Court has
long held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
48
does not confer any right to appeal, even in criminal prosecutions.
49
As the Supreme Court held in Ross v. Moffitt, “[W]hile no one
would agree that the State may simply dispense with the trial stage of
proceedings without a criminal defendant’s consent, it is clear that the

44. See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text.
45. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET: BIA RESTRUCTURING AND STREAMLINING
PROCEDURES 2 (2006), http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/press/06/BIAStreamliningFactSheet030906.
pdf.
46. See id.
47. Michael M. Hethmon, Tsunami Watch on the Coast of Bohemia: The BIA Streamlining
Reforms and Judicial Review of Expulsion Orders, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 999, 1018–20, 1030
(2006).
48. It is recognized, of course, that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
governs the procedures of the BIA and immigration courts, because those adjudicative bodies
are part of the federal government. The Supreme Court, however, has not stated or suggested
that the extent of those due process protections differs in any material way.
49. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
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50

State need not provide any appeal at all.” The same conclusion
applies with respect to appellate review in the administrative process
of immigration proceedings. As the Seventh Circuit put it:
The Constitution does not entitle aliens to administrative appeals.
Even litigants in the federal courts are not constitutionally entitled
to multiple layers of review. The Attorney General could dispense
with the Board [of Immigration Appeals] and delegate her powers
to the immigration judges, or could give the Board discretion to
choose which cases to review (a la the Appeals Council of the Social
Security Administration, or the Supreme Court exercising its
certiorari power). The combination of a reasoned decision by an
administrative law judge plus review in a United States Court of
51
Appeals satisfies constitutional requirements.

This basic principle has been reiterated by every circuit to consider
the question. As the First Circuit put it, “An alien has no
52
constitutional right to any administrative appeal at all.” The Third
53
Circuit agreed. And the Tenth Circuit added, “Rather, the right to
54
appeal is merely a regulatory creation of the Attorney General.”
The Eighth Circuit similarly opined: “[A]n alien has no constitutional
or statutory right to an administrative appeal from the decision of an
55
IJ.” Against this backdrop, any due process challenge to the BIA
streamlining reforms of 1999 and 2002 was destined to be an uphill
struggle.
There were essentially three due process challenges that were
leveled against the reforms. The first and most frequent challenge was
to the BIA’s use of the AWO. The argument against the procedure

50. Id. at 611; see also Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656 (1977) (“[I]t is well settled
that there is no constitutional right to an appeal.” (citing McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684
(1894))); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) (plurality opinion) (“[A] State is not required
by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate courts or a right to appellate review at all.”
(citation omitted)).
51. Guentchev v. INS, 77 F.3d 1036, 1037–38 (7th Cir. 1996).
52. Kechichian v. Mukasey, 535 F.3d 15, 22 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Albathani v. INS, 318
F.3d 365, 376 (1st Cir. 2003)).
53. Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 242 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (“The ‘right to meaningful
review’ . . . is clearly distinguished from ‘the fundamental requirement of due process [that] is
the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner . . . .”).
54. Tsegay v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1347, 1353 (10th Cir. 2004); see also Yuk v. Ashcroft, 355
F.3d 1222, 1232 (10th Cir. 2004) (“We therefore agree with the analysis of Albathani and those
other courts and join them in holding that the summary affirmance procedures do not violate
principles of administrative law or due process.”).
55. Ngure v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 975, 981 (8th Cir. 2004).
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was that the issuance of the AWO denied the alien a meaningful
explanation for the affirmance of the immigration court ruling and a
sufficient basis on which to appeal to the Article III courts, thus
denying the alien due process. The second challenge was that the
AWO denied due process by denying the alien a sufficiently
individualized determination on appeal. The third challenge was that
a decision by a single member of the BIA, as opposed to a threemember panel, did not provide a meaningful opportunity to appeal
and therefore denied the alien due process. All three challenges have
been rejected resoundingly.
56
In 2003, the First Circuit, in Albathani v. INS, was the first to
confront the question of whether the lack of explanation in an AWO
denied an alien due process. The case involved a citizen of Lebanon
who sought asylum on the basis that he was a Christian who feared
57
persecution by members of Hezbollah in Lebanon. The immigration
judge denied Albathani’s application for asylum, withholding of
removal, and relief under the United Nations Convention Against
58
Torture, finding Albathani’s story not credible. The BIA summarily
59
affirmed the immigration judge’s decision by issuing an AWO.
Albathani appealed to the First Circuit, raising his due process claim.
The First Circuit held that the lack of substantive explanation did
not constitute a denial of due process: “The court thus reviews the
BIA decision without knowing its basis. The summary affirmance
scheme does create these problems, but they do not render the
scheme a violation of due process or render judicial review
60
impossible. Nor does the scheme violate any statute.” The court also
reasoned that any “problem” was self-correcting: “In functional
terms, if the BIA does not independently state a correct ground for
affirmance in a case in which the reasoning proffered by the IJ is
61
faulty, the BIA risks reversal on appeal.” Alternatively, the BIA
might risk remand; the relevant circuit may conclude that the AWO
and immigration judge’s opinion, combined, leave important
questions unanswered. In these cases, the court may vacate the BIA’s
dismissal of the alien’s appeal and remand with instructions to the

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Albathani v. INS, 318 F.3d 365 (1st Cir. 2003).
Id. at 367.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 377.
Id. at 378.
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BIA to issue an opinion clarifying its reasons for dismissing the
62
appeal. “In sum, the IJ’s decision provides the reasoned explanation
for the agency’s decision, its existence enables [the court] to review
the agency decision, and the BIA knows that faulty or inadequate
reasoning in the IJ’s decision will lead to the reversal of a BIA
63
summary affirmance of that decision.”
The First Circuit also noted that the U.S. courts of appeals utilize
one-line decisions to dispose of appropriate cases:
Courts themselves use ‘summary affirmance’ or ‘summary
disposition’ procedures in which parties may receive one-line
dispositions of their appeals. These are workload management
devices that acknowledge the reality of high caseloads. They do not,
either alone or in combination with caseload statistics, establish that
64
the required review is not taking place.

Other circuits soon thereafter adopted the reasoning and
conclusion of the First Circuit on the matter. The Fifth, Seventh, and
65
Eleventh Circuits all followed suit within a few months. The Ninth
Circuit summarized the emerging consensus favorably and joined:
“The First Circuit’s opinion in Albathani was the first to address the
issue. Its careful reasoning is persuasive and, like the other courts of
66
appeal that followed, we embrace its rationale.” The Ninth Circuit
rejected the argument that the AWO limited the alien’s ability to
seek review of the agency action in a U.S. court of appeals:
Nor is it a due process violation for the BIA to affirm the IJ’s
decision without issuing an opinion. The IJ’s decision becomes the
final agency action when a case is streamlined. Thus, the
streamlining procedures do not compromise our ability to review the
INS’s decision, to the extent we have jurisdiction to do so, because
67
we can review the IJ’s decision directly.

By effectively referring the court of appeals to the IJ decision, the
AWO would not deny due process—just as a BIA opinion stating “we

62. See Zhu v. Gonzales, 493 F.3d 588, 592 (5th Cir. 2007).
63. Yuk v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1222, 1231 (10th Cir. 2004).
64. Albathani, 318 F.3d at 379 (citation omitted).
65. See Georgis v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 962, 967 (7th Cir. 2003); Soadjede v. Ashcroft, 324
F.3d 830, 832 (5th Cir. 2003); Mendoza v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 327 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2003).
66. Falcon Carriche v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 845, 850 (9th Cir. 2003).
67. Id. at 851 (citation omitted).
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adopt the reasoning and analysis of the immigration judge” would not
68
deny due process.
In December 2003, the Third Circuit—the only circuit to
consider the question en banc—addressed the issue in Dia v.
69
Ashcroft. The case involved a citizen of Guinea who had illegally
entered the United States and applied for asylum, withholding of
removal, and relief under the United Nations Convention Against
Torture. Dia claimed that he would be persecuted in Guinea due to
70
his political opinions. The immigration judge had rejected Dia’s
claims, based on her conclusion that he was not credible, and the BIA
71
summarily affirmed without opinion. In a lengthy opinion addressing
every permutation of Dia’s due process claims, the Third Circuit
opined:
Neither the Constitution nor Congress guarantee a de novo review
by the BIA nor do they guarantee a right to a fully reasoned opinion
by the BIA. We are able to meaningfully review the final
determination of the agency, and, in this context, that is all that due
72
process requires.

The Third Circuit also noted the circumstances that had precipitated
the streamlining reforms, pointing to the “crushing caseload, the
number of cases having increased exponentially in a little over a
73
decade.”
74
In the same month, the Sixth and Eighth Circuits concurred. A
month later, in January 2004, the Tenth Circuit would join its sister
circuits, repeating the observation that “a BIA summary affirmance is
not unlike the summary affirmance or summary disposition
procedures employed by courts, which are workload management
75
devices that acknowledge the reality of high caseloads.”

68. See Yuk, 355 F.3d at 1230.
69. Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc).
70. Id. at 233–34.
71. Id. at 234.
72. Id. at 243 (citations omitted).
73. Id. at 235.
74. Loulou v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 706, 709 (8th Cir. 2003); Denko v. INS, 351 F.3d 717, 732
(6th Cir. 2003).
75. Tsegay v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1347, 1356 (10th Cir. 2004); Yuk v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d
1222, 1232 (10th Cir. 2004).
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Finally, in March 2004, the Second and Fourth Circuits reached
76
the same conclusion. The Second Circuit noted the uniformity with
77
which its sister circuits had rejected similar due process challenges.
Neatly summarizing the conclusion of the other circuits, the court
held:
Our concern is whether streamlining deprives an alien of the process
that he is due by law. Under applicable laws and regulations, even
after streamlining, an applicant for asylum or withholding of
removal remains entitled to a full hearing on his asylum claims, a
reasoned opinion from the IJ, the opportunity for BIA review, and
the right to seek relief from the courts. This is the process Zhang
78
received.

The Second Circuit also mentioned in passing the complaint of some
judges that the streamlining reforms of 1999 and 2002 had, by
removing the logjam of cases, sent a surge of appeals to the circuits.
The court brushed the issue aside as irrelevant: “Whether the
streamlining regulations will or will not add to our burden, however,
79
is not the issue before us.” Although the streamlining reforms had
indeed increased the caseload of the U.S. courts of appeals, such an
increase was inevitable if the backlog was ever to be resolved.
The Fourth Circuit, the final circuit to rule on the question,
reiterated that the AWO was similar to the summary affirmance
procedures used by the U.S. courts of appeals. What was good for the
goose was good for the gander. “The BIA summary affirmance
procedures are not unlike summary disposition procedures routinely
used by appellate courts to resolve cases which do not raise novel or
complex questions and whose issues the lower court has adequately
80
addressed.” And so the cascade of opinions ended. Within a
thirteen-month period from February 2003 to March 2004, eleven
circuits had arrived at the unanimous conclusion that the AWO did
not violate due process. On very few questions have so many circuits
come together so quickly.
The second due process challenge—that an AWO denies the
alien an individualized determination—was addressed by the Third
76. Blanco de Belbruno v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 272, 281 (4th Cir. 2004); Zhang v. U.S. Dep’t
of Justice, 362 F.3d 155, 160 (2d Cir. 2004).
77. Zhang, 362 F.3d at 156–57.
78. Id. at 159.
79. Id.
80. Blanco de Belbruno, 362 F.3d at 281.
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Circuit in Dia. Dia seized upon a statement in an earlier Third Circuit
opinion stating that an alien seeking relief from removal has the due
process right to “‘an individualized determination of his [or her]
81
interests.’” Dia combined this statement with language from another
Third Circuit opinion suggesting that “the BIA denies due process to
82
an alien when it ‘acts as a mere rubber-stamp.’” Dia maintained that
the boilerplate statement of an AWO was therefore a denial of an
83
individualized determination. The Third Circuit rejected the
argument, distinguishing its earlier statements as applying to a case in
which the BIA had chosen to speak and present its own rationale for
its decision. “The situation here is very different; the BIA did not
84
opine on its own, but, instead, referred us to the IJ’s decision.” This
distinction may not have been entirely persuasive as a means of
extricating the court from its prior language, but the court’s
conclusion certainly was:
Dia, nonetheless, also insists that the streamlining regulations
violate his right to an “individualized determination” because they
specifically state that an AWO does not necessarily imply approval
of all of the reasoning of the IJ’s decision. But he fails to articulate
why or how this is so. We are unaware of any requirement, let alone
any constitutional requirement, that an agency adjudicator must
commit to writing or otherwise verbalize his or her reasoning,
where, as here, the agency has directed us to an opinion for review.
In Dia’s case, the due process right to an “individualized
determination” was accorded to Dia at the IJ level, where the IJ
“reasoned” her decision, and the BIA gave the result its imprimatur
pursuant to its regulations. Certainly, the BIA could have
articulated its reasons for affirming the IJ’s order, but just because it
had the power to do so, does not mean the Constitution required it
85
to exercise that power.

Thus, the BIA’s use of standardized language in issuing an AWO did
86
not deny due process.

81. Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 239 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (quoting Abdulai v.
Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 549 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Llana-Castellon v. INS, 16 F.3d 1093, 1096
(10th Cir. 1994))).
82. Id. (quoting Abdulai, 239 F.3d at 550 (quoting Marincas v. Lewis, 92 F.3d 195, 202 n.7
(3d Cir. 1996))).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 240.
85. Id. (citation omitted).
86. See id.
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The third due process challenge—that due process requires an
appeal to a three-member panel rather than a single member of the
BIA—has also been presented less frequently. Its rejection, however,
has been equally emphatic in the three circuits that have addressed it.
The argument was presented to the Ninth Circuit in Falcon Carriche
87
v. Ashcroft, a case involving citizens of Mexico whose request for
88
cancellation of removal was denied. The immigration judge rejected
the Falcon Carriches’ claim that their U.S. citizen daughter would
suffer “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” if the family
were removed to Mexico because the daughter would have difficulty
adapting to the Mexican educational system and because the family
would face economic difficulty in providing for her. The immigration
judge found that any difficulties the daughter would face were neither
89
exceptional nor unusual. A single member of the BIA affirmed the
90
immigration judge’s opinion via AWO. The Falcon Carriches
maintained that review by a three-member panel of the BIA
constituted “an additional procedural safeguard” necessary to ensure
91
due process. The Ninth Circuit disagreed:
Their assertion that “it takes at least three board members to
identify, shape and determine important issues” in every appeal
finds no support in the law. Nor is there any support for their
assertion that a single board member will not conduct the required
review of the IJ’s decision. The Carriches received all of the
administrative appeals to which they were entitled by statute and the
92
Constitution does not require that the BIA do more.

The court also went on to point out that the aliens still possessed, and
were exercising, their right to seek review before a U.S. court of
appeals—which rendered their claim of inadequate appellate review
93
hollow. The Ninth Circuit concluded by reiterating the Supreme
Court’s statement that “administrative agencies should be free to
fashion their own rules of procedure and to pursue methods of

87. Falcon Carriche v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2003).
88. Id. at 848.
89. Id. The “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” criterion is found in 8 U.S.C. §
1229b(b)(1)(D) (2006).
90. Falcon Carriche, 350 F.3d at 845.
91. Id. at 850.
92. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Albathani v. INS, 318 F.3d 365, 376 (1st Cir. 2003)).
93. Id.
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inquiry capable of permitting them to discharge their multitudinous
94
duties.”
The Fourth Circuit also disposed of the notion that a magic
number of three judges was required to meet the requirements of due
process:
Belbruno also claims a due process violation, because a single BIA
member, rather than a three-member panel, decided her appeal. She
claims the resolution of her appeal by a single person resulted in a
greater chance of an inaccurate and constitutionally impermissible
result. But there is no magic—and certainly no due process
implications—in any given number of reviewing judges. What
matters is that Belbruno was able to take the decision of the
Immigration Judge to an authority with the responsibility to
overturn an erroneous decision. And, of course, Belbruno both
possessed and exercised the right to appeal the agency decision to a
panel of this court whose members, coincidentally, are three in
95
number.

The court wisely declined to accept the invitation to hold that due
process required a particular number of appellate judges to guarantee
96
a certain probability of reversal.
The Third Circuit entertained the same due process argument,
phrased as a contention that the single-member review procedure was
97
unfair to the alien. The en banc panel rejected this claim:
We find nothing “unfair” in a constitutional sense about the INS’s
streamlining procedures. An applicant retains a full and fair
opportunity to make his case to the IJ, and has a right to review of
that decision by the BIA, and then by a court of appeals. The fact
that the review is done by one member of the BIA and that the
decision is not accompanied by a fully reasoned BIA decision may
be less desirable from the petitioner’s point of view, but it does not
98
make the process constitutionally “unfair.”

The court’s conclusion is hardly surprising. To hold otherwise would
be to interpret the Due Process Clause as requiring an appellate body
of a minimum size—a difficult conclusion to reach when the Supreme
94. Id. (quoting Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519, 543 (1978)).
95. Blanco de Belbruno v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 272, 282 (4th Cir. 2004).
96. Id. at 283.
97. Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 243 (3d Cir. 2003).
98. Id. at 243–44 (citations omitted).
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Court has held that no appeal at all is necessary to satisfy the
requirements of due process.
In sum, there has been an unusual degree of unity among the
circuits that the BIA reforms of 1999 and 2002 do not deprive an alien
of due process in any way. The only divergence that has emerged
among the circuits is not on the due process question, but on the
tangential question of whether the courts of appeals possess
jurisdiction under the Administrative Procedure Act to review
whether the BIA properly followed federal regulations in deciding to
99
100
use the AWO procedure in a particular case. The First, Third, and
101
Ninth Circuits have held that they do possess jurisdiction to assess
whether the AWO procedure is appropriate in a given case, whereas
102
103
the Eighth and Tenth Circuits have held that they are without
104
jurisdiction to do so. In any event, this circuit split is largely
irrelevant to the due process issue.
IV. MORE ACCURATE APPELLATE ADJUDICATION
A final argument made by critics of the 1999 and 2002 BIA
reforms is that the BIA reversed a lower percentage of immigration
105
judge opinions after the reforms than it did before the reforms. This
argument was actually presented to the Fourth Circuit, which had
little use for it. In the words of Judge Wilkinson, “Such statistics
prove little, however. We have no idea what the optimal rate of
affirmance or reversal of Immigration Judge decisions is, if such an
optimal rate even exists. And [the petitioner] has made no showing
106
that the BIA has failed to conduct the necessary review.” If there
were an objectively correct percentage of reversals that the BIA
should aspire to, such an argument might have merit; but no such
target exists.
Indeed, a stronger argument could be made that, prior to the
2002 reforms, the BIA was more prone to producing inaccurate
99. Haoud v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 201, 206 (1st Cir. 2003).
100. Smriko v. Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 279, 294 (3d Cir. 2004).
101. Falcon Carriche v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 845, 852–53 (9th Cir. 2003).
102. Ngure v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 975, 983 (8th Cir. 2004).
103. Tsegay v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1347, 1355–56 (10th Cir. 2004).
104. See Jessica R. Hertz, Comment, Appellate Jurisdiction over the Board of Immigration
Appeals’s Affirmance Without Opinion Procedure, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1019, 1019–20 (2006)
(discussing the circuit split and arguing that jurisdiction should exist).
105. See DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, supra note 40, at 40.
106. Blanco de Belbruno v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 272, 282 (4th Cir. 2004).
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results by engaging in de novo review of factual findings based on the
reading of cold transcripts. It is difficult to deny that an immigration
judge is in a better position to evaluate the credibility of an alien
testifying before him than a BIA member reading the transcript years
after the words were uttered. The 2002 reforms appropriately
recognized the immigration judge as the primary factfinder in
immigration proceedings.
One possible method of assessing the accuracy of BIA rulings is
to look at the percentage of BIA decisions that are reversed by the
U.S. courts of appeals. Of course, this method assumes that circuit
judges are in the best position to determine the factual accuracy of
results in immigration decisions, which may or may not be the case.
At any rate, the Department of Justice considered this metric in 2006
and found that “the affirmance and reversal (or remand) rates of BIA
decisions have not changed significantly in the wake of the [2002]
restructuring regulation. The vast majority of BIA decisions—more
107
than 90 percent—continue to be affirmed in federal court.” This
suggests that the factual accuracy of BIA decisionmaking remained
the same after the reforms as it had been before the reforms. In any
event, there is no compelling evidence indicating that the reforms
reduced the accuracy of the BIA’s adjudicative process. And if a
massive improvement in efficiency was achieved with no cost
whatsoever in accuracy—and more likely with an improvement in
accuracy in those cases in which the BIA would have otherwise
engaged in de novo review of factual finding—then the BIA
streamlining reforms were a profound success.
CONCLUSION
The story of the BIA streamlining reforms of 1999 and 2002 is
essentially the recurring story of balancing the public’s need for
efficient, accurate, and timely administration of justice against the
individual’s desire to maximize procedural protections and the
number of layers of appellate review. In the landmark due process
108
case of Mathews v. Eldridge the Supreme Court conceived of due
process in similar terms:
[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally
requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private

107. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 45, at 2.
108. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of
an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
109
would entail.

It is always possible, at least in theory, to add another layer of review
to any adjudicative process. And it is similarly possible to add
multiple adjudicators to the layer of review and to free the reviewing
body from the constraints of deference to the lower court. But doing
so exacts a public cost; and it is far from clear that doing so results in
greater accuracy of decisionmaking. In other words, the Mathews
Court contemplated that due process must encompass the procedural
demands of society as well as the procedural demands of the
110
individual.
It bears mentioning that an alien in removal proceedings still
enjoys more layers of review than does a U.S. citizen in federal
criminal or civil proceedings. An alien enjoys three layers of
administrative review (immigration judge, BIA, and potentially the
review of the attorney general), plus two layers of judicial review
(U.S. court of appeals and potentially the review of the U.S. Supreme
Court). In contrast, a citizen only enjoys three layers of review in
federal proceedings (U.S. district court, U.S. court of appeals, and
potentially the review of the U.S. Supreme Court). Yet no serious
person would claim that such federal proceedings constitute a denial
of due process for lack of appellate review.
It is often said that justice delayed is justice denied. That
aphorism is certainly true in most criminal proceedings. It is even
more pertinent, however, in immigration proceedings. This is because
in immigration cases, time is the primary objective. In just about every
removal hearing, what the alien seeks, fundamentally, is more time in
the United States. Conversely, what the government seeks in most
immigration cases is to remove the alien from the United States
sooner rather than later. Therefore, to provide an alien whose appeal
lacks merit more time in the United States simply because of an

109. Id. at 335.
110. Id. at 334 (“Accordingly, resolution of the issue whether the administrative procedures
provided here are constitutionally sufficient requires analysis of the governmental and private
interests that are affected.”).
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unnecessary backlog at the BIA is to deny justice. Or to put it
differently, the more expeditious resolution of immigration cases is a
win-win proposition in terms of justice. If the alien will be the
prevailing party, he or she is better off receiving vindication quickly.
This is particularly true if the alien is detained during the immigration
proceedings. On the other hand, if the government will be the
prevailing party, the country is plainly better off if that determination
is reached sooner. Every additional day that the ultimately removable
alien spends in the United States because of unnecessary delay in the
system is a denial of justice.
Which brings us back to the crisis of backlogged cases that
necessitated the BIA reforms in the first place. There is a weighty
public interest in the administration of the immigration laws without
unnecessary delay. When such delay reaches a point at which it
creates a perverse incentive to file frivolous appeals, the system
becomes unsustainable. This was where the immigration court system
was in February 2002. By 2006, that unnecessary delay had been
eliminated, with no loss of due process and with no loss of accuracy in
decisionmaking. A more perfect system had been achieved.

